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ELECTIONS MATTER
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT*

The invitation to speak at the 2010 Federalist Society Na‐
tional Lawyers Convention was especially meaningful to me as
I consider myself to be the last of a dying breed. When pressed,
I usually have considered myself a moderate, and I have long
feared that there are not many of us left.
As I listened to my fellow panelists at the Convention, 1 I got
the feeling that I was correct. I was also struck, frankly, by
what I did not hear. Despite the recent 2010 midterm elections
in which Republicans had retaken control of the House of Rep‐
resentatives and substantially narrowed the Democratic party’s
control of the Senate, there was no elation. I expected the at‐
tendees to be energized by these recent victories, but instead I
heard a great deal of dissatisfaction with the Constitution, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court.
As the last of my kind, I took heart at what was not said by
my fellow panelists. I took heart that nobody was looking to
the courts to save us, that nobody expressed the view that the
courts ought to strike down the individual mandate provision
* Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law & Director of the
Center on Law and Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Law
School. This Essay is a revised version of the remarks I made on November 18,
2010, as a member of the opening panel, “Enumerated Powers, the Tenth
Amendment, and Limited Government,” of the 2010 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Convention. For its invitation to deliver these remarks, I give a heartfelt
thanks to the Federalist Society. There is simply no organization that is better at
sponsoring robust, respectful, and candid constitutional discourse than the Feder‐
alist Society. I always regard the opportunity to participate in one of its programs
as one of the finest privileges I have had as a law professor.
1. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty‐four: The Constitutional Case
for a Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837 (2011); Mark V.
Tushnet, Entrenching Good Government Reforms, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 873
(2011); Randy Barnett, Remarks at the 2010 Federalist Society National Lawyers
Convention, Enumerated Powers, the Tenth Amendment, and Limited Govern‐
ment (Nov. 18, 2010); Ted Cruz, Remarks at the 2010 Federalist Society National
Lawyers Convention, Enumerated Powers, the Tenth Amendment, and Limited
Government (Nov. 18, 2010).
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of President Obama’s major overhaul of the health care system
and pull us back from the brink on which many attendees be‐
lieve we are teetering. It is a good thing that no one argued that
the courts are the answer to our constitutional dilemma.
After two years of an active, Democratic controlled Congress
and considerable anger in the conservative ranks of the Repub‐
lican party (and the academy), what is a judicially moderate, or
modest, judge to do? I ask the question in this manner because
the Chief Justice of the United States, who was once one of the
most illustrious members of the august Federalist Society, fa‐
mously suggested in his confirmation hearings that a judge or
justice should aspire to be modest in his work.2 He explained
then, and since, that judicial modesty requires Justices to find
consensus as much as possible, to avoid unnecessary concur‐
rences or dissents, and to opt for narrower rulings—and avoid
overturning well‐settled precedent—to minimize both the op‐
portunities for discord on the Court and interference with de‐
mocratic decisionmaking.3 A modest judge respects the work of
the other branches as well as that of the judiciary. As someone
who considers himself a moderate, I am strongly drawn to this
ideal. The question, then, is whether it still has any place in our
constitutional world.
The answer that I wish to offer is the one given by some of
our most eminent judges. Faced with questions not unlike
those that have confronted—and will soon again confront—the
Supreme Court, these jurists have eloquently maintained time
and again that under our Constitution, elections matter. This is
a position that many, if not most, members of the Federalist
Society have long maintained. Members of the Federalist Soci‐
ety know that the Constitution does not embody a particular
political party’s values or agenda, and I believe you would
agree that the Supreme Court should not interpret the Consti‐
tution to help only one political party by advancing its political
interests or agenda. The Constitution vests considerable discre‐
tion in political authorities, who remain politically accountable
for their choices. The 2010 midterm elections reflected the elec‐
2. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Jus‐
tice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (Statement of John G. Roberts Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United
States).
3. Id.
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torate’s attitudes on the direction of the country, including the
Obama Administration’s massive overhaul of the health care
system.4 That is as it should be. Indeed, one of the greatest tradi‐
tions of the Federalist Society has been the effort of its members
to keep the courts from overturning democratic decisionmaking.
Many Federalist Society members have been among the most
eloquent critics of Supreme Court decisions that they believe
have undermined the electoral process. How much easier it is,
we all know, to get five Justices to agree to a proposition as a
matter of constitutional law than to get that proposition ap‐
proved by Congress or fifty state legislatures. As a moderate, I
have long found this tradition to be appealing; it is a tradition
that refuses to abandon the Constitution and accepts that elec‐
tions matter. Judicial modesty is an aspect of this tradition. I be‐
lieve that the judicially modest jurist defers but does not
abdicate to the political process.
Consider the admonitions of several judges and Justices who
have been models of judicial modesty. What they have to say is
as relevant today as it was when they first said it. I begin near
the beginning with the great Chief Justice John Marshall. As we
all know, Chief Justice Marshall wrote the Supreme Court’s
first construction of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden.5
In Gibbons, he defined the Commerce Clause power as “the
power . . . to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be
governed.”6 He further defined the power to reach any “com‐
mercial intercourse . . . which concerns more States than one.”7
The great Chief Justice realized that the Court had defined the
scope of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce
as so broad as to inevitably raise the question of what its limits
might be. He answered that the principal limitation on Con‐
gress’s Commerce Clause power was the design of the federal
political process, in which the States were formally represented
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate so that they
4. See Chris Cillizza, What effect did health‐care reform have on election?, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/
2010/11/07/AR2010110705311.html (The effect of the health care law on the elec‐
tions was “a point of considerable contention” and quoting a senior Democratic
strategist that “The election wasnʹt a referendum on health‐care reform, per se.
But there is no question it played a role in the overarching narrative.ʺ).
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6. Id. at 196.
7. Id. at 193–94.
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could block any federal laws encroaching upon or invading their
sovereignty. Chief Justice Marshall’s answer was that States
were adequately protected from congressional overreaching be‐
cause members of Congress were politically accountable for the
reach and content of their regulations of interstate commerce.
His answer was, in short, that elections matter.
Consider further the insights of another Chief Justice, Wil‐
liam Howard Taft, who knew a thing or two about the Consti‐
tution and the balance of power among the three branches. In
1925, he declared that:
Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the
extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such com‐
merce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or
the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States
from the State of origin. In doing this it is merely exercising
the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the
field of interstate commerce.8

This was a rather remarkable thing to have come from Chief
Justice Taft, but it was not a remarkable thing for a judge to
think, either then or now.
Over the next decade, the Supreme Court rejected constitu‐
tional challenges to Social Security. In both Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis9 and Helvering v. Davis,10 a majority of the Court’s Re‐
publican Justices joined with Justice Brandeis to uphold Con‐
gress’s authority to enact the Social Security Act pursuant to its
taxing and spending powers. Of perhaps particular signifi‐
cance, Justice Benjamin Cardozo suggested that in determining
whether a federal taxing or spending measure had been made
in the “general welfare”11 the Court should defer to the judg‐
ment of Congress. As he explained:
The conception of the spending power advocated by [Alex‐
ander] Hamilton . . . has prevailed . . . . Yet difficulties are
left when the power is conceded. The line must still be
drawn between one welfare and another, between particular
and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be known
through a formula in advance of the event. There is a middle
ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at
8. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1925).
9. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
10. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts.
The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise
of judgment. This is now familiar law. When such a conten‐
tion comes [to the Court, it] naturally require[s] a showing
that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legisla‐
tion fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the
Congress. Nor is the concept of the general welfare static.
Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be
interwoven in our day with the well‐being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the times.12

He was writing in 1937.
Justice Cardozo was saying that elections matter. In light of
what my fellow panelists have said,13 I do not think Justice Car‐
dozo would have feared—and I do not fear—constitutional
conventions. I do not fear the political process in the least. I
welcome political discourse. Indeed, I welcome vigorous politi‐
cal discourse. I even welcome the opportunity to rethink things
in the political sector. So, I am all for whatever a constitutional
convention does—or does not do. It is all fine with me as a con‐
stitutional law professor.
I should note, however, that Justice Cardozo added:
Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of
benefits set forth in Title II [of the Social Security Act], it is
not for [the Court] to say. The answer to such inquiries must
come from Congress, not the courts. [The Court’s] concern
here, as often, is with power, not with wisdom.14

Less than a decade later, another modest jurist, Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone, wrote for a unanimous Court in United States v.
Darby,15 upholding the constitutionality of two challenged pro‐
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. First, he explained that
the law’s prohibition of the shipment of proscribed goods in
interstate commerce was constitutional because, in part:
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate com‐
merce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exer‐
cise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
12. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640–41 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67
(1936)).
13. See supra note 1.
14. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 644.
15. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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which the courts are given no control . . . . Whatever their mo‐
tive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not in‐
fringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary
power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Sub‐
ject only to that limitation, presently to be considered, we
conclude that the prohibition of the shipment interstate of
goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor con‐
ditions, is within the constitutional authority of Congress.16

Justice Stone went on to say that:
[T]hese principles of constitutional interpretation have been
so long and repeatedly recognized by this Court as applica‐
ble to the Commerce Clause, that there would be little occa‐
sion for repeating them now were it not for the decision of
this Court twenty‐two years ago in Hammer v. Dagen‐
hart . . . by a bare majority of the Court over the powerful
and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes . . . .
Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been followed . . . . [T]he the‐
sis of the opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its ef‐
fect to control in some measure the use or production within
the states of the article thus excluded from the commerce
can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional au‐
thority has long since ceased to have force.17

Regarding the validity of the law’s wage and hour require‐
ments, Justice Stone said that, “the only function of courts is to
determine whether the particular activity regulated or prohib‐
ited is within the reach of the federal power.”18 As for the reach
of that power, he explained that Congress “may choose the
means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted
end, even though they involve control of intrastate activities.”19
More recent pronouncements of some prominent Republi‐
can‐appointed jurists are perfectly consistent with these earlier
ones. In Gonzales v. Raich,20 the Court considered a challenge to
the Controlled Substances Act, which was part of a “compre‐
hensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic
in illicit drugs”21 by “prohibit[ing] the local cultivation and use
16. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 115–16.
18. Id. at 120–21.
19. Id. at 121.
20. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
21. Id. at 12.
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of marijuana,” even cultivation that complied with state law
authorizing its use for medicinal purposes.22 In rejecting the
argument that regulating the personal use of marijuana was
outside the scope of Congress’s regulatory authority, Justice
Stevens wrote for the Court:
One need not have a degree in economics to understand
why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of mari‐
juana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use
(which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors,
and family members) may have a substantial impact on the
interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance.
The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a
significant segment of the total market would undermine the
orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is enti‐
tled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, that judg‐
ment is not only rational, but “visible to the naked eye,”
under any commonsense appraisal of the probable conse‐
quences of such an open‐ended exemption.23

Similarly, in his concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia, who
once cautioned that originalist judges should not expect to
make “the world anew,”24 made an even more forceful state‐
ment on behalf of judicial deference to a comprehensive regula‐
tory scheme enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Commerce Clause. As he wrote, Congress pos‐
sesses “regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are
not themselves part of interstate commerce . . . . [even when
they] do not themselves substantially affect interstate com‐
merce.”25 Congress has this power if the activities are “an es‐
sential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.”26
A conservative jurist, Charles Fried, who knows a thing or
two about the Commerce Clause as a great student of the law
and Harvard Law School professor, stated the case for judicial
22. See id. at 5.
23. Id. at 28–29 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
563 (1995)).
24. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 139 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
25. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561).
26. Id. at 36.
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deference with similar force when commenting on the constitu‐
tionality of the individual mandate. In response to an argument
that states could somehow refuse to comply with the new
health care law, he declared: “[The] notion that a state can just
choose to opt out is just preposterous. One is left speechless by
the absurdity of it.”27 It is absurd because it violates Supreme
Court doctrine dating back to the Marshall Court and estab‐
lished further by the Civil War. Professor Fried’s comment is
merely a more current, albeit more colloquial, variation of the
traditional doctrine recognizing plenary federal power to regu‐
late interstate commerce.
Even more recently, in United States v. Comstock,28 the Su‐
preme Court voted seven to two to uphold the constitutionality
of a federal law allowing a district court, upon the motion of
the Department of Justice, to detain indefinitely a “sexually
dangerous” federal prisoner beyond the time when the pris‐
oner would otherwise be released. This decision was significant
for two reasons. First, it recognized broad federal authority
whenever Congress combined its Necessary and Proper Clause
authority with any of its other powers.29 Second, the Chief Jus‐
tice, in accord with his principles of judicial modesty, joined
the Court’s opinion without a word of hesitation.30
Last but not least, consider what another Republican jurist
said on this topic in 2000. Rejecting an argument that the En‐
dangered Species Act unconstitutionally barred a local land‐
owner from killing an animal protected by the Act, then‐Chief
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III declared, “[T]he judiciary has the
duty to ensure that federal statutes and regulations are prom‐
ulgated under one of the enumerated grants of constitutional
authority. It is our further duty to independently evaluate
whether a ‘rational basis exist[s] for concluding that a regu‐
lated activity sufficiently affect[s] interstate commerce.’”31 After
this restatement of the doctrine and the court’s deferential stan‐

27. Nina Totenberg, Opponents Work to Block Health Bill at State Level, NPR, Mar.
23, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125039441.
28. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
29. See id. at 1958.
30. See id. at 1953.
31. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
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dard of review of Commerce Clause enactments, Judge Wilkin‐
son went on to say that:
If we were to decide that this regulation lacked a substantial
effect on commerce and therefore was invalid, we would
open the door to standardless judicial rejection of democratic
initiatives of all sorts. Courts need not side with one party or
the other on the wisdom of this endangered species regula‐
tion. We hold only as a basic maxim of judicial restraint that
Congress may constitutionally address the problem of pro‐
tecting endangered species in the manner undertaken herein.
The political, not the judicial, process is the appropriate arena
for the resolution of this particular dispute.32

I agree with Judge Wilkinson. His statement reflects the
mindset we can expect courts to have now and in the future in
Commerce Clause cases.
So, I am happy to say that, as we all consider how much, if
at all, we should refashion Commerce Clause jurisprudence
in the future, we appear to be disposed in the right direction.
We should be thinking politically, not judicially, and we
should be recognizing that the proper forum for such think‐
ing is outside the courts. I have shared a pattern of deci‐
sionmaking by a series of exemplars of judicial modesty, all
eminent Republican jurists. The positions of these judges
comprise one of the best traditions of the Federalist Society
and one of the best traditions, frankly, in American law. This
is by no means the only tradition of the Federalist Society,
but it is one that seems particularly fitting to reintroduce
now. It is a tradition that is especially important to remem‐
ber in the aftermath of the 2010 mid‐term elections. Under
this tradition, elections matter, they have always mattered,
and they will continue to matter in the future, and courts are
not supposed to overturn—or lightly displace—them. This is
one of the greatest constitutional traditions bequeathed to us
by the Framers, and it is a tradition of the Federalist Society
with which I have been always glad to associate.

32. Id. at 506.

